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The taxation of multinational companies has been
attracting a great deal of attention in recent years. Com-
pany tax planning and country tax competition have
increasingly been questioned, by the general public,
media, in politics and academia. Countries compete for
investment, reducing tax burdens on profits. Multina-
tionals respond, shifting profit for tax purposes to low-
tax jurisdictions by legally arranging their business
affairs in a certain way to optimise their effective corpo-
ration tax burdens. Globalisation speeds-up matters.
The company taxation models that countries apply
today originated in the 1920s. These models were of
course designed to cater for interbellum societal, politi-
cal, economic and business realities, and hence no lon-
ger seem ‘fit -for -purpose’ in today’s globalised market
place. Corporate tax systems are antique and now
appear to be failing, in consequence putting fiscal sys-
tems under pressure. The OECD has estimated missed
corporate tax revenues at a staggering ¼ of a trillion US
dollars a year. To balance budgets, countries resorted to
raising tax burdens on consumption and labour. Eco-
nomic and financial crises that we now seem to have
overcome have exacerbated matters, affecting societal
trust in the integrity of the tax system. The general pub-
lic considers tax bill increases unfair if they are not
addressed to multinationals, but imposed on their work-
ers and customers instead. It is often heard that moral
obligations to finance expenditure apply equally to mul-
tinationals.
The cocktail of ‘races to the bottom’, economic and fis-
cal crises, austerity measures, fiscal consolidation and
social hardship and public discontent lead to an unpre-
cedented political prioritisation of corporate taxation.
On 5 October 2015, the OECD published the outcomes
of its Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) Project it
had undertaken at the request of G20 in 2012. This
marked an unprecedented turning point in the history
of international company taxation. Throughout 2016
and 2017 the European Union adopted a number of the
OECD’s anti-BEPS measures on an EU-wide basis with
a view to addressing multinational tax avoidance practi-
ces via hard law measures. At the international level, the
treaty-related aspects of the BEPS initiative are covered
by the Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Trea-
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ty Related Measures to Prevent Base Erosion and Profit
Shifting’. The treaty is open for ratification, and close to
70 countries have already signed it during the first sign-
ing round held on 7 June 2017 in Paris, France. Howev-
er, all the measures undertaken appear to refurbish
existing anti-tax avoidance approaches, thereby leaving
the root causes of a failing international corporate tax
framework essentially intact.
We have been pursuing the ‘post-BEPS’ path that we
embarked on a couple of years ago, so perhaps now is a
good time to take stock of where we are along the route.
This special edition of Erasmus Law Review, comprising
five contributions, addresses some pivotal topics con-
cerning the taxation of multinationals’ profits in a ‘post-
BEPS’ globalising market environment.
Reuven Avi-Yonah and Haiyan Xu evaluate the BEPS
project of the G20 and OECD and offer some alterna-
tives for reform. They argue that the problems of base
erosion and profit shifting stem from the ‘benefits prin-
ciple’, the independent entity principle and the arm’s
length principle. They contend that adhering to existing
tax paradigms is unlikely to help achieve the envisaged
taxation at the location of value location. They advocate
‘flipping’ of the system and consider the possibility of
taxing passive income primarily at source and active
income primarily at residence.
Hans Gribnau evaluates issues in corporate taxation
from an ethical perspective. Who is to be held responsi-
ble? Is it firms, their consultants, governments? Gribnau
argues that the international tax system is the result of
the interaction of different actors who all share the
responsibility for its integrity. Both states and multina-
tionals – and their advisors – make choices that affect its
operation, and this brings moral responsibility. This
means that countries should cooperate in an effort to
improve the system and that companies should avoid
acting irresponsibly and desist from aggressive tax plan-
ning operations, Gribnau argues.
Irene Burgers and Irma Mosquera examine differences
in perceptions of ‘fairness’ between developed and
developing countries on the issue of taxing multination-
als. Does the BEPS initiative strike a fair balance
between their needs and interests? Perhaps not, Burgers
and Mosquera argue, pointing out fundamental legiti-
macy concerns in this regard, observing that the needs
of developing countries differ from those of the devel-
oped countries while developing countries did not
actually participate in negotiation and decision-making
processes when G20 and OECD formulated their anti-
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BEPS plans. Hence, the BEPS project predominantly
reflects a compromise between rich countries, as is
exemplified by the absence of measures to alter the
existing balance of allocation of tax rights between ‘resi-
dence’ and ‘source countries’, though a lasting point of
contention for developing countries. Burgers and Mos-
quera, in a manner akin to Avi-Yonah and Xu, argue in
favour of a more profound role to be assumed by the
United Nations in the discussion on balancing global
responses to base erosion and profit shifting.
Weber adopts an EU law perspective to compare anti-
treaty abuse approaches in the BEPS initiative against
its counterpart concepts found in EU law in the field of
direct taxation. Weber contends that if the OECD abuse
test is stricter then generally recognized in academic lit-
erature and that the test is in line with the EU law con-
cept of legal certainty, it is also going beyond the scope
of EU abuse of law doctrines. Contrary to EU law abuse
doctrines, the OECD’s approach does not seem to resort
to the artificiality of the intra-firm legal arrangements as
a substantive criterion to establish the presence of abuse;
indeed, a recipe for some heated discussion and future
litigation.
Turning full circle, tax practitioners Harmen van Dam
and Paul Lankhorst assess post-BEPS company tax
environments from the advisory angle. They argue that
the BEPS initiative, in attempting to align taxation and
the location of value creation while maintaining the con-
cepts of separate accounting and arm’s length pricing,
stretches existing tax rules to breaking point. The
OECD seems to be wanting to tax profits by reference
to sales and employee locations, Van Dam and Lank-
horst observe, opining that if this is so, one should then
step away from traditional transfer pricing approaches.
The BEPS initiative, however, does not, leaving many
legal uncertainties and lots of red tape when it comes to
establishing taxpayers’ tax positions.
Thus, ‘Taxing Multinationals ‘Post-BEPS’ – What’s
Next?’ As said, winds of change have been blowing
through the world of international company taxation.
Similar to the position taken by Avi-Yonah and Xu, my
own opinion is that the BEPS project is not the final
destination. The BEPS initiative has left the foundation
concepts of international company taxation intact, along
with its key problems. I do not think that these will tru-
ly be resolved, at least not as long as the international
tax framework is left unaffected. Perhaps the BEPS
project will prove a first step towards a fundamental
remodelling of the international corporate tax regime.
Or, perhaps not; status quos tend to be pretty persis-
tent. Nevertheless, discussions on fundamental corpo-
rate tax reform surely have not ceased since the OECD
released its BEPS outcomes in October 2015. On the
contrary, we have seen many ideas, suggestions, and
proposals for fundamental reform brought forward,
ranging from unitary models to destination-based cash
flow taxation in a variety of forms. On 25 October 2016,
the European Commission released proposals for a
Council Directive on a Common Corporate Tax Base
(CCTB) and a Council Directive on a Common Con-
solidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB), relaunching its
envisaged formulary apportionment system for the
internal market. If adopted, the CCTB/CCCTB direc-
tives would effectively introduce a single, EU-wide cor-
porate tax system for large multinationals, thus replac-
ing the separate national systems currently operating in
the 28 Member States. Time will tell.
I would like to express my heartfelt gratitude to the
authors for their truly excellent contributions, and to
the peer reviewers, of course, for their outstanding
reviews and feedback. The best of luck to all of you, and
again, many thanks for all your work and effort to make
this special issue a success. Many thanks, too, to Mar-
gaux Raynaud and Nettie Dekker for your support and
assistance in putting this edition together. And thanks,
finally, to Kristin Henrard from the editorial board, for
giving me the opportunity to put an edition of Erasmus
Law Review together on this fascinating subject. Dear
reader, I wish you a good read.
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